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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE 
OF ~IIGNON DENHALTER LEWIS 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Case No. 7724 
A careful examination of the Statement of Case 
contained in Appellant's Brief reveals that while the 
Statement of Facts contained therein is accurate there 
are some essential details which were not stated. Such 
essential facts as were not stated it will be necessary to 
recite in respondent's argument and therefore they will 
not be stated in· a Statement of Facts. 
All italics are ours. Parties will be referred to as 
appellants and respondent throughout this brief. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM JOHN CLARK AND 
MARY FRANCES JOHNSTON LOVELESS, WITNESSES, 
WAS COMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
POINT II. 
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTING 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT WILLIAM H. 
ENGLISH IS THE GRANDSON OF HENRY CHARLES DEN-
HALTER. 
POINT III. 
WILLIAM H. ENGLISH AS MATTER OF LAW IS EN-
TITLED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF 
THE ESTATE OF MIGNON DENHALTER LEWIS, AS HER 
GRANDNEPHEW. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM JOHN CLARK AND 
MARY FRANCES JOHNSTON LOVELESS, WITNESSES, 
WAS COMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
The testimony of William John Clark concerning 
statements that were made t.o him by his wife was compe-
tent evidence· and properly received by the trial court. 
The declarant of the statements was Mr. Clark's wife, 
Daisy Lenore Clark. Mrs. Clark died in 1910 (R. 16, 18). 
Mrs. Clark's statements to her husband concerned the 
birth of a child born in her home and which was adopted 
by close friends of her family, the John Henry J ohnstons. . 
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nirs. Clark 'vas present at the birth of the child (R. 20). 
She 'vas also the party who 1nade the arrangements 
through Doctor Root for Julia Rosa to con1e to her 
home for the birth of the child. l\fr. Clark was present 
in the home at that time and "'"hile he did not see the 
mother until after the child was born he was conscious 
of the fact that the child was born in his home. It was 
logical that the birth of the child would be discussed 
bet,veen himself and his wife. 
The circumstances recited make all of the evidence 
1\Ir. Clark gave entirely competent. All of the declara-
tions to which l\Ir. Clark testified were made prior to 
any controversy and under circumstances which would 
indicate that the statements were trustworthy. There 
was no reason for any bias or prejudice and the persons 
discussing the matter had no interest or motive to deceive 
and had every opportunity of acquiring accurate knowl-
edge and knowing the true facts. 
Hearsay evidence under the circumstances has his-
torically been found to be competent. 
The hearsay exception of declarations about family 
history or pedigree has been universally recognized in 
all common law jurisdictions. Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd 
Edition, Volume 5, Sections 1480 through 1503, pages 
291 to 326, discusses clearly and forcefully the cases and 
rules of law governing this exception to the hearsay rule. 
His discussion points out that the basis for receiving 
hearsay evidence is necessity. Very often declarants and 
persons who have first-hand knowledge of the occur-
rences are dead or unavailable. There are many sub-
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stantial safeguards for trustworthiness. People who talk 
over family affairs when there is no reason for bias or 
passion usually attempt to tell the truth and their state-
ments in such discussions are trustworthy. They are 
made prior to the time that any controversy arose and 
by persons who had no interest or motive to deceive. 
Statements must also come from persons who appear to 
have a fair knowledge or fair opportunity to acquire 
knowledge on the subject about which they make their 
declarations. l\1:rs. Clark's declarations were made con-
cerning her own personal observations. 
In some jurisdictions only declarations of relatives 
are properly receivable. This requirement has been 
abandoned by enlightened jurisdictions when necessity 
required it. Section 1487, page 304, of Wigmore states 
that the declarant is qualified whenever he is found to be 
"likely to know the facts,'' "having an opportunity to 
know the facts," or holding a relation, rendering it 
very probable that he would learn them truly and when 
such circumstances exist it is not necessary that the 
declarant be a relative. 
In J . .A.. Turner v. W. M. Person, 175 N.C. 219, 95 
S.E. 362, hearsay evidence was received concerning a 
doctor's statement to the father of _a child concerning 
the fact that the child had been born alive,. The North 
Carolina court cites and quotes Wigmore's rules, approv-
ing them. 
In Hoyt v. Lightbody, 98 Minn. 198, 116 Am. St. Rep. 
366, 108 N.W. 843, a husband of a half-sister of the de· 
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ceased wife "~as allowed to testify and the Supreme 
Court of Minnesota concluded as follows: 
•'The evidence of a 'Yitness whose knowledge 
'vith reference to the subject was derived from an 
intimate acquaintance 'vith the family is admiss-
ible to prove such facts of family history as mar-
riage, kinship, name, and death. (Citing cases)." 
In Alston v. Alston, 114 Iowa 29, 86 N.W. 55, de-
clarations of a man and his wife who we-re friends of the 
parents and in whose home the child resided were re-
ceived and held admissible even though the declarants 
were in no way related to either of the persons whose 
family history was an issue. 
Frey v. Thomas, 207 Iowa 1229, 224 N.W. 597, fol:-
lowing Alston v. Alston, allowed a foster mother's de-
claration to be testified about and again Wigmore's 
treatise on evidence was cited with approval. See also 
for similar holdings Budlong v. Budlong, 48 R. I. 144, 
166 Atl. 308; Jackson v. Cooley, 8 John 130 (N.Y.); In 
Re Hamm's Estate, 186 Okla. 610, 99 P. 2d 895. 
Pro~essor Wigmore after reviewing many authori-
ties which have had occasion to pass on the family pedi-
gree exception to the hearsay rule concluded as follows 
(Vol. 5, p. 305) : 
"It is not necessary to maintain that the state-
ments of any friend are always admissible; but 
it is desirable to disavow any limitation which 
would exclude the statements of one whose inti-
macy with the family could leave no doubt as to 
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his sufficient knowledge, equally with the family 
members, of the facts of the family history." 
This exception to the hearsay rule was covered by 
the A. L. I., Model Code of Evidence, Rule 524, Subsec-
tion 2 (a) (i), which reads as follows: 
" ( 2) Evidence of a hearsay statement of a 
matter concerning the birth, marriage, divorce, 
death, legitimacy, race-ancestry, relationship by 
blood or marriage or other similar fact of the 
family history of a person other than the declar-
ant 
(a) is admissible if the judge 
(i) finds that the declarant was related to 
the other by blood or marriage or finds that the 
declarant was otherwise so intimately associated 
with the other's family as to be likely to have ac-
curate information concerning the matter de-
clared, and made the statement as upon informa-
tion received from the other or from a person re-
lated by blood or marriage to the other, or as 
upon repute in the other's family, and 
(ii) finds that the declarant is unavailable 
as a witness; and 
(b) may be admitted by the judge in the 
exercise of his discretion if he finds the facts 
specified in clause (a) (i) of this Paragraph even 
if all declarants are available." 
Mrs. Clark, the declarant in the present case, was 
intimately associated with the Johnstons, Julia Rosa and 
her mother. She was actually present at the birth of the 
child to Julia Rosa. What she was declaring concerned 
an event she witnessed. She told her husband that a boy 
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child \Yas born to Julia Rose. No one could have pos-
sessed n1ore opportunity to observe and accurately know 
the facts declared. She had no n1otive to deceive nor bias 
or prejudice and it is inconceivable that at that early date 
there could have been a thought of any controversy con-
cerning the event which she observed and related to 
her husband. Clark's testimony came well within the 
exception to the hearsay rule. 
Rule 43 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure re-
quires that the rule which favors the reception of evi-
dence rather than any rule which would exclude it be 
followed by the courts of this state. Respondent submits 
that this Court should adopt the A. L. I., Model Code of 
Evidence, Rule 524, Subsection 2, as the law of this State, 
it being the rule which favors the reception rather than 
exclusion of evidence. 
:Jir. Clark knew of the child being born in his ovvn 
home from observations that he had made around the 
home. He lmew that Julia Rosa was the daughter of his 
housekeeper and that she came to the home with Henry 
Charles Denhalter and demanded the return of her child. 
Mr. Clark was very well acquainted with Henry Charles 
Denhalter for Mr. Denhalter delivered soft drinks to the 
saloon in which Mr. Clark worked as a bartender (R. 22). 
He also testified from his oWn. knowledge concerning the 
child that grew up in the Johnston family and was in that 
family immediately after the episode of the birth of a 
child in his home. There was only one child ever born 
in his home so there can 'be no problem of confusion as 
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to the child. Most of Clark's testimony was based on his 
own observations rather than hearsay. 
Mary F-rances Johnston Loveless, the adopted sis-
ter of William Hen,ry Johnston, knew many things from 
her own observations. She saw the baby in the arms of 
its natural mother being dressed and made ready for the 
reception by her mother. She saw the same baby after-
wards in her own home. She recalls the return of the 
mother with Henry Charles Denhalter, describing the 
episode that Mr. Clark testified about (R. 49). She testi-
fied about the demands made by Julia Rosa and Henry 
Charles Denhalter after their marriage when they came 
to attempt to regain the child that Julia Rosa had given 
away prior to her marriage. The only evidence presented 
by Mrs. Loveless to which appellant takes exception was 
the statement concerning the writing which Mrs. Loveless 
saw in her mother's chest. The statements of Mrs. Love-
less concerning the birth of the child, its date of birth, 
and the parentage of the child would have been state-
ments from a relative: of William Henry Johnston, i.e. 
his foster mother. The information which she gave in the 
writings, while hearsay, would come within the commo~ 
law rule allowing hearsay state·ments from relatives. 
Through Mrs. Loveless, William Henry Johnston is 
traced from the time he was in the arms of his mother 
to his manhood and back into the Denhalter family. 
Even though some incompetent hearsay evidence 
was received by the trial court, this Court will assume 
that the trial court, having full knowledge of the law and 
being the finder of the fact, would ignore any such in-
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of fact. 
In a decision of the Supreme Court written by coun-
sel for appellants, 'vho 'vas then Chief Justice of this 
Court, the rule 'vas set do,vn in the following language, 
Christensen v. Johnson, 90 Utah 127, 61 P. 2d 597, 600: 
"* * * When a cause is tried before a court, 
as was this cause, an appellate court is not prone 
to reverse the judgment because evidence was 
improperly admitted. In such case the presump-
tion· is indulged that the trial court disregarded 
the evidence which was improperly received in 
reaching its conclusions. Victoria Copper Mining 
Co. v. Haws, 7 Utah 515, 27 P. 695; Spratt v. 
Paulson, 49 Utah 9, 161 P. 1120; Utah State Build-
ing & Loan Ass'n v. Perkins, 53 Utah 474, 173 
P. 950; Matson v. Matson, 56 Utah 394, 190 P. 
943; Peek v. Bailey, 57 Utah 546, 196 P. 206. In-
dependent of the evidence which defendant claims 
was improperly received, there was competent 
and substantial evidence offered and received in 
support of the findings made by the trial court. 
This being an action at law, we are bound by 
s~ch findings." 
See also Corey v. Roberts, 82 Utah 445, 25 P. 2d 940; 
Quermbeck v. Hanson, 94 Utah 127, 75 P. 2d 1027; Fed-
eral Land Bank of Berkeley v. Salt Lake Valley Sand & 
Gravel Co., 96 Utah 359, 85 P. 2d 791. It would there-
fore appear that the only basic propositions meriting 
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consideration by this Court is whether or not there was 
substantial evidence from which the trial court could 
have found the issues in favor of plaintiff. 
POINT II. 
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTING 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT . WILLIAM H. 
ENGLISH IS THE GRANDSON OF HENRY CHARLES DEN-
HALTER. 
There is no conflict in any of the evidence presented. 
The testimony of William Clark that there was a child 
born in his home and that the child went into the John-
ston home, which testimony is corroborated in all of its 
details by the testimony of Mrs. Loveless, is uncontra-
dicted by any evidence. The further testimony that the 
baby which went into the J oh:riston home, was born to 
Julia Rosa, and that thereafter Julia Rosa and Henry 
Charles D-enhalter came and demanded the return of the 
child, stating that it was their child, was also entirely 
uncontradicted by any evidence. 
It is undisputed that the child taken into the John-
ston home from the- Clark home grew up to be William 
Henry Johnston, father of respondent. Some attempt 
is made in appellant's brief to cast doubt on the weight 
of Clark's testimony because he did not see William 
Henry Johnston for a period of approximately eighteen 
years. But his evidence that this baby who he saw in the 
Johnston home over a period of approximately five years 
was the same person he saw in 1927 is positively corro-
borated and substantiated by Mrs. Loveless, the adopted 
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11 
sister of ,~Villiain Henry Johnston and kne'v him through 
all his life. 
In addition to the evidence presented by the testi-
mony of ~Ir. Clark and ~Irs. Loveless 've have the record 
of the marriage bet,veen Henry Charles Denhalter and 
Julia Rosa. vVe kno"'" from the testimony of Mrs. Glea-
son that Henry Charles Denhalter and Julia Rosa kept 
company prior to their marriage and were seen together 
on numerous occasions (R. 65, 66). The court could 
well have found from the fact that Julia Rosa and Henry 
Charles Denhalter married very soon after the birth of 
Julia's child and immediately made demand for the re-
turn of the child born to Julia, that Henry Charles Den-
halter was the father of the child born to Julia. Re-
spondent submits that this conduct of the two young 
people alone would justify a finding that Henry Charles 
Denhalter was the father of Julia's child. But, as has 
been pointed out, respondent's case rests on a much 
firmer basis. We have all of the testimony from Mr. 
Clark, Mrs. Loveless and Mrs. Gleason, which points 
unerringly to the one logical conclusion: that William 
Henry Johnston was the son of Julia Rosa and Henry 
Charles Denhalter. 
In addition to the evidence surrounding the birth 
of William Henry Johnston, when he grew to manhood 
the evidence shows without contradiction that his father, 
Henry Charles Denhalter, and Julia Rosa Hummel recog-
nized their child. That Henry Charles Denhalter re-
ceived William Henry Johnston into his home as his long 
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lost son, paid his living expenses, and took care of his 
wife and infant child for a period of approximately 
five years (R. 31). Even the deceased Mignon Denhalter 
Lewis stated that respondent, William H. English, re-
sembled the Denhalter boys, particularly Bob Denhalter 
(R. 38). 
There was no dispute concerning these facts. All 
parties admit that Julia Rosa Hummel came from Cali-
fornia, stayed at the Denhalter home while William 
Henry Johnston was there and that the purpose of her 
coming to the Denhalter home was to visit with her long 
lost son. 
The conduct of Julia Rosa Hummel and Henry 
Charles Denhalter at the time William Henry Johnston 
returned to Salt Lake City and their treatment of him 
and his wife could only be explained by the fact that a 
child of their marriage had been born and they believed 
he had now returned. This conduct, when considered 
with the testimony of Mr. Clark and Mrs. Loveless, 
proves beyond any possible dispute that there was a son 
born to Julia Rosa as a result of her relationship with 
Henry Charles Denhalter and William Henry Johnston 
was that son. 
POINT III. 
WILLIAM H. ENGLISH AS MATTER OF LAW IS EN-
TITLED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF 
THE ESTATE OF MIGNON DENHALTER LEWIS, AS HER 
GRANDNEPHEW. 
Under Points Four and Five of Appellants' Brief 
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they argue that the respondent, beeause of the circum-
stances surrounding his birth, should not be allo,ved to 
share in the estate of ~lignon Denhalter Lewis, his great-
aunt. 
From appellants' argument it appears that they 
have t'YO basic propositions, one that under the circum-
stances William Henry Johnston did not become legi-
timized for all purposes and therefore William H. 
English, his son, cannot inherit through his father's natu-
ral father, and second, that he cannot inherit from col-
lateral lines. 
There are three sections of our Utah Code which 
cover in one way or another the question of legitimizing 
children born out of wedlock. Section 14-2-14, Utah Code 
Annotated 1943, reads as follows: 
"If the mother of any such child and the 
father shall at any time after its birth intermarry, 
the child shall in all respects be deemed to be 
legitimate, and the bond for its support shall 
thereupon become void." 
Section 14-4-12, Utah Code Annotated 1943, further 
showing legislative intent reads as follows: 
"The father of an illegitimate child, by public-
ly· acknowledging it as his own, receiving it as 
such with the consent of his wife, if he is married, 
into his family, and otherwise treating it as if it 
were a legitimate child, thereby adopts it as such, 
and such child is thereupon deemed for all pur-
poses legitimate from the time of its birth. The 
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foregoing provisions of this chapter do not apply 
to such an adoption." 
Title 101, Utah Code Annotated 1943, covering Wills 
and Succession also has a particular section covering the 
inheritance by illegitimate children. Said section is 101-
4-10 and reads as follows: 
"Every illegitimate child is an heir of the 
person who acknowledges himself to be the father 
of such child, and in all cases is an heir of his 
mother; and inherits his or her estate, in whole 
or in part, as the case may be, in the same manner 
as if he had been born in lawful wedlock. The 
issue of all marriages null in law, or dissolved 
by divorce, are legitimate." 
Utah court interpretations of the sections quoted 
have not been very extensive. This is perhaps due to the 
fact that there is one decision of our Supreme Court 
which sets the matter down in such language that there 
can be no misunderstanding of the meaning and intent 
of the legislative enactment. Chief Justice Frick in 
Rohwer v. District Court of First Judicial District, 41 
Utah 279, 125 P. 671, in a very well-reasoned decision 
interpreting Section 2850 of the Compiled Laws of 1907, 
passed upon the meaning of the following language con-
tained in said section "and to have and enjoy all rights 
and priyileges to the same extent and in the same man-
ner as though born in lawful wedlock." It will be noted 
that in the quoted sections of our present day statutes 
we have language which in its context is practically the 
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san1e as the language 'vhich Chief Justice Frick is inter-
preting in the Roh zver case. The question was before 
the court as to 'vhether or not a child who had been il-
legitimate could take through representation from col-
lateral heirs. The court in its opinion states as follows 
at page 675: 
"The question for us to solve therefore is : 
What 'vas the intention of the Legislature in 
adopting section 2850~ It is seriously contended 
that all the Legislature intended to and did ac-
complish was to permit the children who were 
born before January 4, 1896, as the issue of 
plural marriages, to inherit from both parents. 
That is, while such children were legitimated, 
they, nevertheless, were not legitimated for all 
purposes, but such legitimation was limited to 
the right of inheriting from both parents ; a right 
not existing at common law. But that is not what 
the statute says. The language there used is that 
such children are 'hereby legitimated; and such 
issue are entitled to inherit from both parents, 
and to have and enjoy all rights and privileges 
to the same extent and in the same manner as 
though born in lawful wedlock.' If the construc-
tion contended for be applied, namely, that no 
further rights than to inherit from. both parents 
were conferred, then the words given in italics 
are practically meaningless. The suggestion that 
they are intended to confer either family or social 
rights or privileges is entirely untenable, be-
cause such rights or privileges are already cov-
ered by the term 'legitimate.' Moreover, in view 
of what has already been said, and which was 
well known to the Legislature, such children were 
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not in need of having their social or family rights 
protected; but they were sorely in need of being 
given the legal rights which were enjoyed by their 
half-brothers and half-sisters. These latter rights 
and privileges, therefore, were intended to be 
and were given by the section in question. And, 
so as to leave no lingering doubt in the mind of 
any one what the rights and privileges were, the 
Legislature defined them by making them the 
same as those that are enjoyed by those who 
were born in lawful wedlock. Language could not 
have been selected which was better calculated to 
define what rights and privileges were given. The 
legal rights and privileges given were to be the 
exact equivalent of those enjoyed by all legitimate 
children." 
"* * * if we held, in the case at bar, that in 
adopting section 2850 it was not intended to con-
fer all the rights and privileges enjoyed by legi-
timate children upon those mentioned in that sec-
tion, including the right of transmitting property. 
Neither the language nor spirit of that section 
authorizes the conclusion that any part of the 
stigma which by the common law is cast upon 
bastards shall continue to be visited upon those 
who are provided for therein. 
"The record in this case also discloses that 
said Joseph T. Anderson was publicly acknowl-
edged by Nephi Anderson as his own child, was 
received into and cared for in Mr. Anderson's 
family, and treated as his own. In view of this, 
we think that under the provisions of section 10, 
which we have hereinbefore set forth in full, said 
Joseph T. Anderson must be 'deemed for all pur-
poses legitimate from the time of his birth.' The 
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language there used is that such a ehild is legi-
timated for all, and not only for some, purposes. 
'All purposes' mean that the child may transmit 
property as \vell as inherit it. Courts have no 
right to place limitations on plain and unambigu-
ous language, unless under peculiar circumstances 
liinitations are required for the purpose of pre-
serving or making effective other provisions upon 
the same subject." 
From the language quoted it is obvious that the 
Utah Supreme Court was putting into effect in its full 
blown for1n all of the salutary purposes that the legiti-
mization statutes were enacted to accomplish. 
At common law it was the harsh rule that an illegi-
timate child was without parent and without relative 
of any kind. This rule was never the law under the civil 
code. The civil code with respect to illegitimacy was 
more humane and accomplished a fairer treatment of the 
innocent child whose only sin was that of his father and 
mother. 
Respondent has examined a large number of deci-
sions and in no case decided by the United States courts 
has he had been able to find any decision which does not 
take the same view as the Utah decision quoted and does 
not select as being a liberal and humane doctrine the 
civil law view of illegitimate children. 
In 10 C.J.S., Section 14, page 71, the general rule 
of law is set down by the editors. They state categori-
cally that usually legitimation changes the status and 
capacity of the illegitimate child to the status of a child 
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born in lawful wedlock, and interpreting the words 
"lawful wedlock," which words appear in Section 101-
4-10, Utah c·ode Annotated 1943, the editors state that, 
in other words, the civil and social status of such child 
becomes that of a lawful child of the natural father; that 
as such lawful child of a natural father the child has 
all the rights of a lawful child born in lawful wedlock. 
Among the rights thus conferred is the right to take or 
inherit from and claim as heir of the deceased father and 
as the representative of his parents and to transmit prop-
erty to others than the heirs of his body. The only time 
when there is any dissent from this general law is when 
there is a specific unequivocal statement in the statute 
which will defeat the illegitimate child's right to inherit 
after he has been made legitimate. 
Two other courts have had occasion to pass specifi-
cally on the right of a legitimated child to take by repre-
sentation from collateral relatives of the father. The 
California Supreme and Appellate Courts in the case of 
Wolf v. Gall, 32 Cal. App. 286, 163 P. 346, 348 (Appellate 
Court decision), 32 Cal. App. 286, 163 P. 350 (Supreme 
Court decision), decided that legitimated children could 
inherit from their grandmother by right of representa-
tion of their deceased father. The court went to great 
lengths and spelled out with great detail the reasoning 
behind its decision. The following indicates without 
possible doubt the humane and liberal purposes accom-
plished by the decision : 
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~~_ . .:\ .. t common la'v a child born out of wedlock 
"~as said to be filius nullius, and to have no herit-
able blood. These expressions are of course figur-
ative, and meant no more than that certain le:gal 
disabilities 'Yere attached to his status, one of 
which was his lack of capacity to inherit from 
his father or his parents' kindred. There can be 
no doubt that the Legislature could remove those 
disabilities. The right of inheritance of legitimate 
and illegitimate children alike is a creature of law, 
and can be changed by the Legislature at any time 
and to any extent. When the law provides means 
for making legitimate a child born out of wedlock, 
it changes the status of that child, and in the ab-
sence of special provision to the contrary, he 
thenceforth comes within the provisions of the 
laws relating to legitimate children. Thereafter a 
child so legitimated is included in the designation 
'child' or 'children' when those words refer to a 
child or children legitimately born; and he is no 
longer included in the designation 'illegitimate 
child' when that term is used in a statute, unless 
it is obvious that such words are intended by the 
Legislature to include one who, though now legi-
timate, was formerly illegitimate. We think these 
propositions are self-evident. Of what avail is 
it to have legitimated a child if he still labors 
under the disabilities of his former condition~ If 
he has not acquired the rights by law given to, 
and become subject to the duties imposed upon, 
his new condition, there has been no change at all, 
for it is obvious that the fact that he was born out 
of wedlock has not been changed and never can be. 
If any stigma attaches to that condition it still 
remains, and all that the law can do-and all it 
seeks to do-is to remove the disabilities attached 
to the condition." 
* * * * 
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"That the words 'children' and 'lawful issue' 
when found in statutes of succession are not to be 
confined to their strict common-law signification 
was decided by our Supreme Court in the Estate 
of Wardell, 57 Cal. 484, 491, where it is said: 
" 'If courts were now to restrict the word to 
its common-law meaning, all children born of an 
unlawful marriage, all children by adoption or 
acknowledgment of their father, and all children 
whose parents intermarried subsequent to their 
birth, would be excluded from rights of inheri-
tance or succession. But by statute, the offspring 
of marriages null in law (section 84, Civ. Code), 
children born out of wedlock whose: parents subse-
quently intermarried (section 215, Id.), and chil-
dren by acknowledgment or adoption of their 
father (sections 224, 227, 228, and 230, Id.), are all 
legitimate. The·se, although incapacitated at com-
mon law from succeeding to any rights of their 
father, are regarded for all purposes as legitimate 
from the time of their birth. * * * Hence the term 
'children,' as used in section 1307 of the law of 
succession, must relate to status, not to origin-
to the capacity to inherit, not to the legality of the 
relations which may have existed between those 
of whom they may have been begotten. The word 
has, therefore, a statutory and not a common-law 
meaning; and its meaning includes all children 
upon whom has been conferred by Law the capa-
city of inheritance.' 
* * * * 
"It results from what we have said that the 
respondents, having been legitimated by the sub-
sequent marriage of their parents, come within 
the terms of section 1386 of the Civil Code, and 
that within the meaning of that section they are 
'lawful issue' and take by representation." 
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The statutes interpreted by the California court are 
different in their 'Yarding from the ones now before 
this Court, but respondent submits that the Utah Code 
is plainer in its meaning and more succinctly states the 
legislative intent that a legitimated child is to be placed 
on the san1e footing and have the same status and capa-
city as a child "Those lawful status has never been in 
question. 
The Supreme Court of Kansas in Smith v. Smith, 
105 Kan. 294, 182 P. 538, 540, having before it the Kan-
sas legitimation statute, decided that a child who had 
been legitimated could take by representation from a 
grandfather and other collateral kindred. Their holding 
and the facts on which they acted are set forth in the 
following language: 
"Having determined that the plaintiff may 
inherit from his putative father, there remains 
the question whether he is entitled to inherit 
through the father from his grandfather or other 
collateral kindred. The solution of the question 
must be found in the statute. Under the common 
law an illegitimate child was deemed to be outside 
the line of inheritance. To o:vercome. and remedy 
this injusice the Legislature has specifically con-
ferred the right of inheritance upon illegitimate 
children and to effectuate the purpose the statute 
should be given a liberal interpretation. In sec-
tions 3844 and 3845, Gen. St. 1915, it is provided 
that-
" 'lllegitimate children inherit from the 
mother, and the mother from the children.' Sec-
tion 3844. 
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" 'They shall also inherit from the father 
whenever they have been recognized by him as his 
children; but such recognition must have been 
general and notorious, or else in writing.' Section 
3845. 
"In section 3846 it is provided: 
" 'Under such circumstances, if the recogni-
tion of relationship has been mutual the father 
may inherit from his illegitimate children.' Sec-
tion 3846. 
* * * * 
"It is contended that as the right depends 
upon the statute, and as section 3845 expressly 
pro-vides that an illegitimate shall inherit from his 
father, it evidences a legislative intention not to 
put such child in the line of inheritance the same 
as children born in wedlock, but to limit the right 
to inherit from the father alone. The other sec-
tions indicate a purpose to take away the dis-
qualification resulting from illegitimacy and to 
clothe the illegitimate with heirship and place 
him in the line of succession with other children 
of an intestate. It is provided that the illegitimate 
shall inherit from his mother, and in similar lan-
guage gives him the right to inherit from his 
father. Then follows the provision that the 
mother shall inherit from the illegitimate child 
and, where there is the required recognition, the 
father also shall inherit from such child. Then, 
as showing that the relationship when duly estab-
lished by recognition is not limited to the. father 
and child, it is provided that in the matter of 
inheritance the mother and her heirs shall take 
preference over the father and his heirs. 
"The Legislature contemplated a. relationship 
of succession not only with the father but also 
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"Tith the heirs of the father. We have no doubt 
from the language used that the Legislature in-
tended to give an illegitimate the status of a 
general heir in the matter of the descent and dis-
tribution of the property of an intestate, and that 
the plaintiff is entitled to inherit from his father's 
father. 
""The judgment will therefore be reversed 
and the cause remanded, with directions to make 
partition of the property involved in accordance 
with the opinion herein." 
Respondent submits that no more or better authori-
ties could possibly be found for the proposition that he, 
under Utah law, is entitled to take as the representative 
of his father all of the property which would have des-
cended to his father from his great-aunt, Mignon Den-
halter Lewis. 
In the brief of counsel for app·ellants there are state-
ments that the general law is against the position which 
respondent maintains. All of the authorities which claim-
ant has been able to discover are to the contrary. A 
very- good general discussion of the general law, its 
growth and the salutary and humane propositions which 
have been accomplished by legitimization statutes is 
found in Lund's Estate, 26 Cal. 2d 472, 159 P. 2d 643, 162 
A.L.R. 606. In its decision the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia points out the harsh rules that grew up· in the 
common law and which were abandoned by nearly every 
American jurisdiction. The decision points out that 
what American courts and legislatures now have is the 
civil view of legitimization. Under the civil law the in-
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nocent child was not punished for the sins of his father 
and mother but was given the same consideration that 
the children born in wedlock were given. The court 
points out that under all the state laws the fathers of 
illegitimate children are required to support those chil-
dren, and this Court knows that under our Utah law such 
a burden has been placed upon the father. The decision 
further points out that as a social force the requirement 
that a father of a child born out of wedlock be required 
to assume responsibility for it has a deterring effect on 
the prospective parents of such children, and a penalty, 
if any penalty is to be assessed, is placed on the father 
of the child born out of wedlock and not upon the inno-
cent child who can in no way be held responsible. The 
Lund Estate decision cites Pfeifer v. Wright, 41 F. 2d 
464, a case which sets forth the civil and common law 
distinctions and the humane course that American courts 
and legislatures have pursued. 
There is one decision in the books which reaches a 
contrary result from that reached by the overwhelming 
majority of American jurisdictions. That case is In Re 
Cross, 197 N. C. 334, 148 S. E. 456, 64 A.L.R. 1121. The 
result arrived at by the North Carolina court is based on 
an erroneous conception of. a rule: of construction which 
has grown up in some of our American jurisdictions. 
That conception is that statutes in derogation of the 
common law must be strictly construed. The. proper 
rule of construction is really stated that statutes in dero-
gation of the common right must be strictly construed. 
See Harvard -Law Review, 21-383. The North Carolina 
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court does not in any ",.RY discuss its result or show 
what purpose its harsh decision can accomplish. 
The annotation following the Cross decision, as re-
ported by .A .. L.R., points out that the Cross result is 
contrary to the great majority of the decisions of courts 
dealing 'vith the right of inheritance by legitimated chil-
dren from collateral heirs. In the annotation it cites the 
case of Jackson v. JJloore, (1849) 8 Dana (Ky.) 170, and 
quotes the following from said case: 
'"Thus, in Jackson v. Moore (1849) 8 Dana 
(Ky.) 170, an antenuptial child who was legiti-
mated by the parents' marriage and father's re-
cognition was held entitled, as his 'descendant' 
and representative, to a distributive share in per-
sonal property left by an intestate and childless 
uncle, the father's brother, the father having pre-
deceased the uncle-reliance being placed upon 
a statute of 1796, which provided: 'Where a man, 
having by a woman one or more children, 
shall afterward intermarry with such woman, 
such child or children, if recognized by him, shall 
be thereby legitimated. The issue, also, in mar-
riage deemed null in law, shall nevertheless, be 
legitimate.' The court stated that the evident 
object of that statute was to make such children 
'in all respects as legitimate as they would have 
been had they been the issue of lawful wedlock;' 
that the subsequent marriage and recognition ipso 
facto legitimated the child; that 'there is no other 
limitation or qualification in either the letter or 
the policy' of the statute; and that, since the child 
necessarily became the father's legitimate child 
in some sense and for some purpose, 'she is as 
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necessarily such a child in every sense and for 
every purpose of filial legitimacy.'" 
The annotation further sets forth a number of authori-
ties which show beyond any possible doubt that the 
North Carolina court in Re Cross reached a harsh, erron-
eous and unnecessary result. 
Appellants cite as authority for their proposition 
24 A.L.R. 553. There are a great number of cases col-
lected in the annotation. Some of the cases are con-
cerned with children who have never become legitimate 
under any statute or by virtue of any action and, of 
course, in many states the illegitimate child who has 
not been made legitimate is still harshly dealt with, but 
where there are statutes which make illegitimate chil-
dren legitimate through acknowledgment or by the mar-
riage of their parents the annotation at page 586 states 
categorically as follows: 
"By statute, in most jurisdictions, an ille-
gitimate child which has been acknowledged or 
recognized by its father may become his heir, 
* * * " 
By "heir" respondent submits the annotator meant that 
the legitimated child is given the capacity to inherit 
by representation from collateral heirs of his father. 
Respondent submits that the cases cited and the 
annotations show without possible dispute that under our 
Utah statutes the language (101-4-10) "and inherits his 
or her estate, in whole or in part, as the case may be, 
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in the same manner as if he had been born in lawful wed-
lock,'' can only mean that the child takes by representa-
tion from the collateral heirs of his father. In addition 
to the language of 101-±-10, the language of 14-4-12 which 
states that the child made legitimate by the father's 
acknowledgment is "thereupon deemed for all purposes 
legitimate from the time of its birth," shows conclusively 
that there is not to be left any sen1blance of penalty 
for promiscuity on such child. All rights of a legitimate 
child are conferred upon him. Respondent further res-
pectfully submits that this court should, in properly 
and lawfully construing the statutes and achieving a 
humane liberal result in this case, hold that respondent 
takes the share of his father in the estate of Mignon 
Denhalter Lewis. 
At page 43 of appellants' brief they argue that 
William H. English should not be allowed to share in the 
estate of Mignon Denhalter Lewis for the reason that 
William Henry Johnston had been adopted into the John-
ston family and therefore entered a new line of inheri-
tance and was prohibited by law from inheriting from 
his natural parents. The same argument was made be-
fore this Court in Benner v. Garrick, 109 Utah 172, 176, 
166 P. 2d 257. In the Benner case a child had been adop-
ted by his grandmother. It was held by this Court 
that such adopted child was not only entitled to inherit 
through his blood lines as a grandchild but that he also 
took the share that he would have as a child of the adop-
tive parent which, in effect, gave to the adopted child a 
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double inheritance. This Court setting forth its reasons 
at page 176 said: 
"* * * Had the legislature desired a different 
result it could have enacted a law forbidding dual 
inheritance. Furthermore, when a person adopts 
a child an act of favoritism is shown thereby; it 
becomes another child in the family of the adopt-
ing parent and inherits as such. Had a person 
not a relative been adopted by decedent, the other 
heirs would not have had one person less in their 
own family entitled to take by representation and 
they would therefore have gotten no more than 
they will now. Had the decedent desired other-
wise she could have made a will to that effect. 
See In re Bartram's Estate, 109 Kan. 87, 198 P. 
192; Wagner v. Varner, 50 Iowa 532; and In re 
Wilson's Estate, 95 Colo. 159, 33 P. 2d 969, which 
hold that an adopted grandchild can take its in-
heritance in the dual capacity of child of its adopt-
ing parent and also by representation as the 
natural child of its deceased parent in the absence 
of a statute forbidding it." 
Respondent submits that the just, humane, and 
generally accepted principles of law require that this 
c·ourt affirm the· judgment of the trial. court and hold 
that he takes his rightful share of his great-aunt's estate. 
c·oNCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully submits that the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the trial court that 
William H. English, son of William Henry Johnston, 
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was the grandnephew of Mignon Denhalter Lewis and 
took by representation the share of William Henry John-
ston in the estate of niignon Denhalter Lewis is sup-
ported by substantial evidence and is in accordance with 
the law of the State of Utah and the Decree adjudging 
that William H. English take by rep-resentation the share 
of his father, .William Henry Johnston, should be af-
firmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, BLAC·K, 
ROBERTS & BLACK, 
DWIGHT L. KING, 
Attorneys for Respondent, 
530 Judge Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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